{"id":303,"date":"2011-07-24T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2011-07-24T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":""},"modified":"-0001-11-30T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"-0001-11-30T00:00:00","slug":"","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/dchrs.org\/?p=303","title":{"rendered":"Article 15 communication on Crimes against Humanity committed in Syria"},"content":{"rendered":"
\nClick Here to Access and Read Full Release<\/span><\/strong><\/a>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\n

\n <\/span>Submitted
\nby:<\/span><\/u>\n<\/p>\n

\n –  <\/span>Damascus Center for Human Rights Studies<\/span>\n<\/p>\n

\n–  <\/span>The Law Firm of M. Yaser Tabbara, Chicago, USA<\/span>\n<\/p>\n

\n–  <\/span>YASA, International Kurdish Centre for Legal
\nStudies & Consultancy<\/span>\n<\/p>\n

\n–  <\/span>Union of Syrian Kurds in the Netherlands<\/span>\n<\/p>\n

\n–  <\/span>INSAN, an international human rights
\norganization<\/span>\n<\/p>\n<\/div>\n


\n<\/span><\/p>\n

\nI.                   
\n<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/strong><\/span>Introduction <\/span><\/strong>\n<\/p>\n

\n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

\n1.        
\n<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span>The NGOs making this submission have personally
\ninterviewed witnesses of the crimes mentioned in this report, which have
\nexceeded four hundred (400) interviews conducted on site and more than two
\nthousand (2000) phone calls and other types of testimonies. The NGO’s have also
\nengaged a local network of activists in order to obtain reliable and credible
\ninformation. Furthermore, they have summarised a selected number of reliable
\nand publicly available international NGO reports on alleged crimes committed in
\nSyria in order to corroborate the first hand information they have collected. <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

\n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

\n2.        
\n<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span>The NGOs submit that there is a reasonable
\nbasis to believe that crimes against humanity were committed in the context of
\nthe Syrian popular uprising, in particular crimes against humanity of murder;
\nimprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty; enforced
\ndisappearance, persecution and Torture. There are so far no national
\nproceedings implemented by the State to investigate and try those who bear the
\nresponsibility of these crimes. Although on March 19 the state news agency
\nSyrian Arab News Agency (SANA) reported that the Ministry of the Interior would
\nform a committee to investigate the “unfortunate incidents” in Daraa, and would
\nrespond with “all measures deemed necessary”, the prospect of seeing this
\ncommittee implemented is very slim. Thus, the NGOs making this submission put
\nthe international community on notice that the policy conceived at the highest
\nechelons of the State to commit crimes against humanity, the gravity of the
\ncrimes as well as the absence of any future prospects for ending the impunity
\nfor their perpetrators should prompt the international community to urgently
\nact in order to halt the bloodshed. <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

\n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

\nII.
\nSubject matter Jurisdiction<\/span><\/strong>\n<\/p>\n

\n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. Article 53(1)(a) provides that
    \n\tthe Prosecutor of the ICC shall consider whether the information available
    \n\tto him provides a reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the
    \n\tjurisdiction of the Court has been or is being committed.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    \n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

      \n
    1. For a crime to fall within the
      \n\tCourt’s jurisdiction: (i) the crime must be one of the crimes set out in
      \n\tarticle 5 of the Statute (jurisdiction ratione materiae<\/em>); (ii) the
      \n\tcrime must have been committed within the timeframe specified in article
      \n\t11 of the Statute (jurisdiction ratione temporis<\/em>); and (iii) the
      \n\tcrime must satisfy one of the two criteria laid down in Article 12 of the
      \n\tStatute.      [1]<\/span><\/sup><\/span><\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

      \n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

        \n
      1. The NGOs submitting this
        \n\tcommunication are cognisant to the fact that the preconditions for the
        \n\texercise of jurisdiction by the Court are not met for the situation in
        \n\tSyria. Indeed, Syria is
        \n\tnot a State party to the Rome Statute and thus the Court cannot exercise
        \n\tjurisdiction on the crimes committed on the Syrian territory or by
        \n\tnationals of Syria.
        \n\tHowever, the NGOs wish to recall that this situation might change if the
        \n\tSecurity Council was to refer the situation to the ICC, in which case it
        \n\twould have jurisdiction on these crimes. The NGOs conceive this
        \n\tapplication as an attempt to pave the way for the future analysis of the
        \n\tCourt on the horrendous crimes committed therein, and to show to the
        \n\tinternational community that by all accounts these egregious violations of
        \n\thuman rights constitute crimes against humanity that should be repelled,
        \n\tincluding by prosecuting those who bear the greatest responsibility. <\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

        \n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

        \nIII.
        \nLegal characterisation and reasons that the listed crimes fall within the
        \njurisdiction of the ICC<\/span><\/strong>\n<\/p>\n

        \n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

          \n
        1. For the reasons set out in this
          \n\tsubmission, the information collected by the NGOs provide a reasonable
          \n\tbasis to believe that crimes against humanity under article 7 of the
          \n\tStatute have been committed in Syria.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

          \n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

          \n                <\/span>(a) Contextual elements of
          \ncrimes against humanity<\/span>\n<\/p>\n

          \n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

            \n
          1. As recalled by the Pre Trial Chamber
            \n\tII of the ICC in its Decision on the Authorization of an Investigation in
            \n\tKenya             [2]<\/span><\/sup><\/span><\/sup><\/a>,
            \n\tthe contextual elements of crimes against humanity are set out in the
            \n\tChapeau of article 7 (1) as follows:<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

            \n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

            \n‘crimes
            \nagainst humanity’ means any of the following acts when committed as part of a
            \nwidespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with
            \nknowledge of the attack.<\/span><\/em>\n<\/p>\n

            \n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

            \nArticle
            \n7(2)(a) of the Statute further indicates that:<\/span>\n<\/p>\n

            \n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

            \n‘[a]ttack
            \ndirected against any civilian population’ means a course of conduct involving
            \nthe multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian
            \npopulation, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy
            \nto commit such attack.<\/span><\/em>\n<\/p>\n

            \n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

              \n
            1. PTC II interpreted these
              \n\tparagraphs as requiring five contextual elements for crimes against
              \n\thumanity: (i) an attack directed against any civilian population, (ii) a
              \n\tState or organizational policy, (iii) the widespread or systematic nature
              \n\tof the attack, (iv) a nexus between the individual act and the attack, and
              \n\t(v) knowledge of the attack. <\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

              \n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

              \n                <\/span>(i) Attack directed against any
              \ncivilian population<\/span><\/em>\n<\/p>\n

              \n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

                \n
              1. In the Decision on the
                \n\tAuthorization of an Investigation in Kenya, PTC II derived from the
                \n\tStatute and the elements of crimes the conclusion that the attack “consists
                \n\tof a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred
                \n\tto in article 7(1)”. Furthermore, it recalled that the term is not
                \n\trestricted to “a military attack” and rather refers to “a campaign or
                \n\toperation carried out against the civilian population”.                [3]<\/span><\/sup><\/span><\/sup><\/a>
                \n\t<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                \n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

                  \n
                1. When defining the term
                  \n\t“directed against any civilian population”, the Chamber considered that it
                  \n\trequires showing that the attacks were directed against the civilian
                  \n\tpopulation as a whole and not against randomly selected individuals. <\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                  \n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

                    \n
                  1. Furthermore, the Chamber
                    \n\tspecified that it need not be satisfied that the entire civilian
                    \n\tpopulation of the geographical area in question was being targeted.
                    \n\tHowever, the civilian population must be the primary object of the attack
                    \n\tin question and cannot merely be an incidental victim. The term “civilian
                    \n\tpopulation” refers to persons who are civilians, as opposed to members of
                    \n\tarmed forces and other legitimate combatants.                    [4]<\/span><\/sup><\/span><\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                    \n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

                      \n
                    1. It appears from the available
                      \n\tinformation that most of the attacks carried out by the Syrian regime were
                      \n\ttargeting civilians in the cities where the uprising took place. The
                      \n\tpopulation targeted by these attacks was unarmed civilian people who took
                      \n\ton spontaneously to the streets in Deraa, Damascus,
                      \n\tHoms, and
                      \n\tother cities in order to express their protest against the repressive
                      \n\tregime and to call for a change in the state policy. Several videos shown
                      \n\ton media and social networks show hundreds of demonstrators rallied in the
                      \n\tmain squares or streets of these cities, chanting “selmia, selmia” [peaceful,
                      \n\tpeaceful], opening their shirts to show that they carried no arms, etc.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                      \n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

                        \n
                      1. Information collected by local
                        \n\tand international NGOs testify that the civilian groups targeted were at
                        \n\tfirst all the protesters that took up to the streets. Security forces opened
                        \n\tfire on these demonstrators in an arbitrary and indiscriminate way. The
                        \n\tsecond pattern of attacks against the civilian population was through vast
                        \n\tcampaigns of arbitrary arrests, that targeted real or perceived opponents
                        \n\tor even people who had no history of opposition to the government but
                        \n\tsimply demonstrated spontaneously against the regime during the uprising. <\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                        \n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

                        \n(ii)
                        \nState or organizational policy<\/span><\/em>\n<\/p>\n

                        \n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

                          \n
                        1. In addition, article 7(2)(a) of
                          \n\tthe Statute imposes the requirement that the attack against any civilian
                          \n\tpopulation be committed “pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or
                          \n\torganizational policy to commit such attack” .<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                          \n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

                            \n
                          1. The introduction to elements of
                            \n\tarticle 7, when explaining the meaning of policy states that “policy to
                            \n\tcommit such attack” requires that the state or organization actively
                            \n\tpromote or encourage such an attack against a civilian population. The
                            \n\tfootnote to the paragraph states “a policy, which has a civilian
                            \n\tpopulation as the object of the attack would be implemented by State or
                            \n\torganizational action. Such a policy may, in exceptional circumstances, be
                            \n\timplemented by a deliberate failure to take action, which is consciously
                            \n\taimed at encouraging such attack. The existence of such a policy cannot be
                            \n\tinferred solely from the absence of governmental or organizational
                            \n\taction”. <\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                            \n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

                              \n
                            1. In the Case The Prosecutor v. Katanga
                              \n\tand Ngudjolo Chui, Pre-Trial Chamber I found that this requirement:<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                              \n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

                              \n[…]
                              \nensures that the attack, even if carried out over a large geographical area or
                              \ndirected against a large number of victims, must still be thoroughly organised
                              \nand follow a regular pattern. It must also be conducted in furtherance of a
                              \ncommon policy involving public or private resources. Such a policy may be made
                              \neither by groups of persons who govern a specific territory or by any
                              \norganisation with the capability to commit a widespread or systematic attack
                              \nagainst a civilian population. The policy need not be explicitly defined by the
                              \norganisational group. Indeed, an attack which is planned, directed or organised
                              \n– as opposed to spontaneous or isolated acts of violence – will satisfy this
                              \ncriterion.<\/span><\/em>[5]<\/span><\/sup><\/span><\/span><\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/em>\n<\/p>\n

                              \n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

                                \n
                              1. In relation to the term
                                \n\t“policy”, the Majority recalled in particular the criteria used by the
                                \n\tInternational Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) in the
                                \n\tcase against Tihomir Blaskic, in which the ICTY Trial Chamber held that
                                \n\tthe plan to commit an attack: <\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                                \n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

                                \n[…]
                                \nneed not necessarily be declared expressly or even stated clearly and
                                \nprecisely. It may be surmised from the occurrence of a series of events, inter
                                \nalia:<\/span><\/em>\n<\/p>\n

                                \n–       
                                \n<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span>The general historical circumstances and the
                                \noverall political background against which the criminal acts are set;<\/span><\/em>\n<\/p>\n

                                \n–       
                                \n<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span>The establishment and implementation of
                                \nautonomous political structures at any level of authority in a given territory;<\/span><\/em>\n<\/p>\n

                                \n–       
                                \n<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span>The general content of a political programme,
                                \nas it appears in the writings and speeches of its authors;<\/span><\/em>\n<\/p>\n

                                \n–       
                                \n<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span>Media propaganda;<\/span><\/em>\n<\/p>\n

                                \n–       
                                \n<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span>The establishment and implementation of
                                \nautonomous military structures; the mobilisation of armed forces;<\/span><\/em>\n<\/p>\n

                                \n–       
                                \n<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span>Temporally and geographically repeated and
                                \nco-ordinated military offensives;<\/span><\/em>\n<\/p>\n

                                \n–       
                                \n<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span>Links between the military hierarchy and the
                                \npolitical structure and its political programme;<\/span><\/em>\n<\/p>\n

                                \n–       
                                \n<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span>Alterations to the "ethnic"
                                \ncomposition of populations;<\/span><\/em>\n<\/p>\n

                                \n–       
                                \n<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span>Discriminatory measures, whether administrative
                                \nor other (banking restrictions, laissez-passer,…);<\/span><\/em>\n<\/p>\n

                                \n–       
                                \n<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span>The scale of the acts of violence perpetrated –
                                \nin particular, murders and other physical acts of violence, rape, arbitrary
                                \nimprisonment, deportations and expulsions or the destruction of non-military
                                \nproperty, in particular, sacral sites.<\/span><\/em>                                [6]<\/span><\/sup><\/span><\/span><\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/em>\n<\/p>\n

                                \n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

                                  \n
                                1. The NGOs submit that the
                                  \n\tattacks on the civilian population in Syria were not isolated or
                                  \n\tspontaneous acts of violence, but were committed pursuant to the policy of
                                  \n\tthe State of Syria under the leadership of President Bashar al Assad.  <\/span>This policy is to launch violent attacks
                                  \n\tagainst political opponents or persons perceived to support the political
                                  \n\topponents in order to retain power by all means. This policy is further
                                  \n\tevident due to the following:<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                                  \n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

                                    \n
                                  1.  \n
                                      \n
                                    1. The policy of the State is
                                      \n\t\tsubject to the political and contextual background on the nature of the
                                      \n\t\tSyrian police state, i.e. the implementation of the Emergency law since
                                      \n\t\t1963; the control of the President and his close relatives on the State
                                      \n\t\tapparatus; media control, etc.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                                      \n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

                                        \n
                                      1.  \n
                                          \n
                                        1. The policy of the State is
                                          \n\t\talso evident through the consistent denial of the crimes committed by the
                                          \n\t\tsecurity forces and the attempt to portray protesters as terrorists
                                          \n\t\tgroups, armed gangs or foreign elements. <\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                                          \n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

                                            \n
                                          1.  \n
                                              \n
                                            1. The policy of the State was
                                              \n\t\tclearly demonstrated by several official communiqués circulated as “top
                                              \n\t\tsecret” documents throughout the Syrian Security Apparatus different
                                              \n\t\tbranches, and leaked to various NGO’s. These communiqués identify violent
                                              \n\t\tmeans to crush protesters.  <\/span><\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                                              \n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

                                                \n
                                              1.  \n
                                                  \n
                                                1. The policy of the State can be
                                                  \n\t\tfurther exemplified by the attempts to conceal evidence of the commission
                                                  \n\t\tof crimes by: <\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                                                  \n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

                                                  \n§   <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span>Confiscation of
                                                  \ncellular phones and other recording devises from victims and witnesses of the
                                                  \ncrimes<\/span>\n<\/p>\n

                                                  \n§   <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span>Imposition of a
                                                  \ntotal blackout on foreign media <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

                                                  \n§   <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span>Imposition of
                                                  \nsieges on some cities. During the siege, a large-scale campaign of arbitrary
                                                  \narrests was implemented, further demonstrating the policy of the State to
                                                  \nstifle dissent and deter any future demonstration. <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

                                                  \n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

                                                    \n
                                                  1.  \n
                                                      \n
                                                    1. The discovery of mass graves
                                                      \n\t\tin several locations in the Horan region and Homs also shows that there
                                                      \n\t\twas a policy of the State of Syria which involved the use of extensive
                                                      \n\t\tmeans for the burial of the victims. The existence of mass graves is an
                                                      \n\t\texample of the organised character of the attack on the civilian
                                                      \n\t\tpopulation, involving the mobilisation of state apparatus, various
                                                      \n\t\tsecurity forces and other institutions in order to carry out the policy.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                                                      \n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

                                                        \n
                                                      1.  \n
                                                          \n
                                                        1. The deployment of heavy
                                                          \n\t\tarmament inside the cities of Deraa, Banias, Latakia, Homs, Idlib and
                                                          \n\t\tother smaller cities and villages across Syria demonstrates a State
                                                          \n\t\tpolicy by deploying official Syrian Army divisions to deal with the
                                                          \n\t\tprotestors en masse.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                                                          \n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

                                                          \n(iii)
                                                          \nWidespread or systematic nature of the attack<\/span><\/em>\n<\/p>\n

                                                          \n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

                                                            \n
                                                          1. As held by Pre‐Trial Chamber II
                                                            \n\tof the ICC, the reference to a widespread or systematic attack has been
                                                            \n\tinterpreted as excluding isolated or random acts from the concept of
                                                            \n\tcrimes against humanity.[7]<\/span><\/sup><\/span><\/sup><\/a>
                                                            \n\tOnly the attack, and not the alleged individual acts are required to be
                                                            \n\t“widespread” or “systematic”.                                                            [8]<\/span><\/sup><\/span><\/sup><\/a>
                                                            \n\tIn this regard, the adjective “widespread” refers to “the large‐scale
                                                            \n\tnature of the attack and the number of targeted persons”, while the
                                                            \n\tadjective “systematic” refers to the “organised nature of the acts of
                                                            \n\tviolence and the improbability of their random occurrence”.                                                            [9]<\/span><\/sup><\/span><\/sup><\/a>
                                                            \n\tThe Chamber, moreover, opined that the existence of a State or
                                                            \n\torganisational policy is an element from which the systematic nature of an
                                                            \n\tattack may be inferred.                                                            [10]<\/span><\/sup><\/span><\/sup><\/a>
                                                            \n\tThe consequences of the attack upon the targeted population, the number of
                                                            \n\tvictims, the nature of the acts, the possible participation of officials
                                                            \n\tor authorities or any identifiable patterns of crimes, could be taken into
                                                            \n\taccount to determine whether the attack satisfies either or both
                                                            \n\trequirements of a ‘widespread’ or ‘systematic’ attack." <\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                                                            \n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

                                                              \n
                                                            1. Based on the available
                                                              \n\tinformation, there is a reasonable basis to believe that the attacks
                                                              \n\tdirected against the civilian population in Syria were both widespread and
                                                              \n\tsystematic. <\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                                                              \n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

                                                                \n
                                                              1. The attacks followed these main
                                                                \n\tpatterns: <\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                                                                \n§   <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span>The launching
                                                                \nof large scale military operations on towns and neighbourhoods identified as
                                                                \nhubs of protests. For example On April 25, security forces and military
                                                                \nvehicles moved into the city of Daraa using military vehicles, including
                                                                \nnumerous tanks and armoured personnel carriers (APCs), under a cover of heavy
                                                                \ngunfire that lasted unabated for about 16 hours (see below for more details).
                                                                \nThe security forces occupied all neighbourhoods in Daraa, imposed checkpoints,
                                                                \nand placed snipers on the roofs of buildings in many parts of the city. They
                                                                \nimposed a siege on the city, cut off electricity and all means of
                                                                \ncommunications, and prevented any movement by opening fire on anyone who tried
                                                                \nto leave their house. Once they had established full control of the city, the
                                                                \nsecurity forces then proceeded to arrest hundreds of men from their homes. This
                                                                \npattern would be repeated in a number of places, with varying degrees of
                                                                \nmilitary involvement. For example it was followed in Douma, on the 25th<\/sup>
                                                                \nof April. The same pattern of conduct was also followed in Zabadani near Damascus, on the 1st<\/sup>
                                                                \nof May. On the 6th<\/sup> of May, the army and security forces using
                                                                \narmoured vehicles and tanks, surrounded the coastal town of Banyas and they entered under cover of heavy
                                                                \ngunshot.<\/span>\n<\/p>\n

                                                                \n§   <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span>Security forces
                                                                \nalso placed snipers on the roofs of buildings in the above mentioned cities.
                                                                \nThe snipers were apparently clearly instructed to implement a shoot to kill
                                                                \npolicy, as they were targeting vital body organs. Several testimonies collected
                                                                \nfrom the residents of these cities and examinations of the entry points of
                                                                \nbullets that victims were subjected to corroborate evidence of the instructions
                                                                \ngiven to snipers.<\/span>\n<\/p>\n

                                                                \n§   <\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span>The State conducted
                                                                \na campaign of arbitrary arrest in all the cities under siege. At times, they
                                                                \nresorted to intimidation of the families of political opponents and even
                                                                \ndetained them in order to obtain information on the whereabouts of the
                                                                \nopponents. <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

                                                                \n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

                                                                  \n
                                                                1. On the basis of the available
                                                                  \n\tinformation, the NGOs consider that at a minimum the following conduct has
                                                                  \n\tbeen committed: <\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
                                                                    \n
                                                                  1.  \n
                                                                      \n
                                                                    1. murder constituting a crime
                                                                      \n\t\tagainst humanity under article 7(1)(a) of the Statute; <\/span><\/li>\n
                                                                    2. imprisonment or other severe
                                                                      \n\t\tdeprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of
                                                                      \n\t\tinternational law under article 7 (1) (e) of the Statute; <\/span><\/li>\n
                                                                    3. enforced disappearance of
                                                                      \n\t\tpersons under article 7 (1) (i) of the Statute and<\/span><\/li>\n
                                                                    4. persecution under article 7(1)
                                                                      \n\t\t(h) of the Statute.<\/span><\/li>\n
                                                                    5. Torture under article 7(1) (f)
                                                                      \n\t\tof the Statute.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                                                                      \n <\/span><\/em>\n<\/p>\n

                                                                        \n
                                                                      1. Thus far, the submitting NGO’s
                                                                        \n\tdocumented more than 1168 cases of death from across Syria, as well as
                                                                        \n\tmore than 3000 cases of injury, in addition to more than 893 cases of
                                                                        \n\tforced disappearances and 11000<\/a> cases of arbitrary
                                                                        \n\tdetention, all since March 15th<\/sup> of this year. A mass grave was
                                                                        \n\talso discovered in Daraa which contained 13 bodies, including bodies of
                                                                        \n\tchildren, in addition to significant indications of other 7 mass graves in
                                                                        \n\tHoms and Horan regions. The methodology of documentation which was
                                                                        \n\tfollowed by the reporting NGO’s is the Oxford Research Group Protocols. Witnesses
                                                                        \n\talso told the reporting NGO’s that they and other detainees were subjected
                                                                        \n\tto various forms of torture, including torture with electro-shock devices,
                                                                        \n\tcables, and whips. Most also said they were held in overcrowded cells and
                                                                        \n\tmany said they were deprived of sleep, food, and water, in some cases, for
                                                                        \n\tseveral days. Some said they were blindfolded and handcuffed the entire
                                                                        \n\ttime.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                                                                        \n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n

                                                                        \n<\/p>\n
                                                                        \n
                                                                        \n

                                                                        \n[1]<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a> <\/span>Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo<\/span><\/em>,
                                                                        \n“Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against
                                                                        \nJean-Pierre Bemba Gombo”, <\/span>                                                                        ICC-01\/05-01\/08-14-tENG<\/span><\/a><\/span>, 17 July
                                                                        \n2008, para. 12.<\/span>\n<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

                                                                        \n

                                                                        \n[2]<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a>
                                                                        \nPre Trial Chamber II, <\/span>Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute
                                                                        \non the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of
                                                                        \nKenya, 31 March 2010, ICC-01\/09, para.77-78, <\/span>                                                                        http:\/\/www.icc-cpi.int\/iccdocs\/doc\/doc854287.pdf<\/span><\/a> <\/span>\n<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

                                                                        \n

                                                                        \n[3]<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a>
                                                                        \nPre Trial Chamber II, <\/span>Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute
                                                                        \non the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of
                                                                        \nKenya, 31 March 2010, ICC-01\/09-19-Corr, para.80. <\/span><\/span>\n<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

                                                                        \n

                                                                        \n[4]<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a>
                                                                        \n<\/span>ICC-01\/09-19-Corr,
                                                                        \npara.82.<\/span>\n<\/p>\n

                                                                        \n <\/span>\n<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

                                                                        \n

                                                                        \n[5]<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a>
                                                                        \n<\/span>Pre-Trial Chamber I,
                                                                        \nDecision on the confirmation of charges, ICC-01\/04-01\/07-717, para.<\/span>\n<\/p>\n

                                                                        \n396. See also
                                                                        \nPre-Trial Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome
                                                                        \nStatute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo,
                                                                        \nICC-01\/05-01\/08-424, para.<\/span>\n<\/p>\n

                                                                        \n81. See also ICTY,
                                                                        \nProsecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgement, 7<\/span>\n<\/p>\n

                                                                        \nMay 1997, para. 653;
                                                                        \nR. Dixon, C. K. Hall, "Article 7", in O. Triffterer (ed.). Commentary
                                                                        \non the<\/span>\n<\/p>\n

                                                                        \nRome<\/span> Statute of the
                                                                        \nInternational Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article, 2^^^ ed. –<\/span>\n<\/p>\n

                                                                        \n(Munich etc.:
                                                                        \nC.H.Beck etc., 2008), p. 236.<\/span><\/span>\n<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

                                                                        \n

                                                                        \n[6]<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a> <\/span>ICTY, Prosecutor v.
                                                                        \nBlaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement, 3 March 2000, para. 204.<\/span><\/span>\n<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

                                                                        \n

                                                                        \n[7]<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a> KENYA para 94 <\/span>\n<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

                                                                        \n

                                                                        \n[8]<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a> KENYA para 94<\/span>\n<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

                                                                        \n

                                                                        \n[9]<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a> KENYA para 95<\/span>\n<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

                                                                        \n

                                                                        \n[10]<\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a> <\/span>ICC01\/0501\/0814tENG<\/span>,
                                                                        \npara. <\/span>33.<\/span><\/span>\n<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

                                                                        <\/div>\n
                                                                        \n

                                                                         <\/p>\n

                                                                        Click Here to Access and Read Full Release<\/span><\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n

                                                                         The NGOs making this submission have personally
                                                                        \n interviewed witnesses of the crimes mentioned in this report, which have
                                                                        \n exceeded four hundred (400) interviews conducted on site and more than two
                                                                        \n thousand (2000) phone calls and other types of testimonies. The NGO’s have also
                                                                        \n engaged a local network of activists in order to obtain reliable and credible
                                                                        \n information. Furthermore, they have summarised a selected number of reliable
                                                                        \n and publicly available international NGO reports on alleged crimes committed in
                                                                        \n Syria in order to corroborate the first hand information they have collected. <\/span> <\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"author":30,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-303","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/dchrs.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/303","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/dchrs.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/dchrs.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dchrs.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/30"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dchrs.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=303"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/dchrs.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/303\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/dchrs.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=303"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dchrs.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=303"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dchrs.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=303"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}