{"id":1161,"date":"2013-03-14T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2013-03-14T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":""},"modified":"-0001-11-30T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"-0001-11-30T00:00:00","slug":"","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/dchrs.org\/?p=1161","title":{"rendered":"Summary killings and other abuses by armed opposition groups"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>\n14 March 2013\n<\/p>\n<p>\n<em>&nbsp;&ldquo;My daughter  shouted to me, &lsquo;mum, come quick and see dad.&rsquo; He was on TV&hellip; as he was shown  being killed, I pushed my daughter away to block her from seeing&hellip; but she did  see.&rdquo;<\/em>\n<\/p>\n<p>\nWidow of Colonel Fou&rsquo;ad Abd al-Rahman, as identified by his  family, whose beheading with Colonel Izz al-Din Badr was aired on television  and the Internet.\n<\/p>\n<p>\nThe dead bodies found every day in towns and villages across  Syria bearing marks of execution-style killing and torture are the grim  evidence of mounting war crimes and other abuses being committed not just by  government forces, but also by armed opposition groups &ndash; some but not all more  or less loosely affiliated with the Free Syrian Army (FSA) &ndash; in the context of the  country&rsquo;s bitter internal armed conflict. Such groups are summarily killing  people with a chilling sense of impunity, and the death toll continues to rise  as more towns and villages come under the control of armed opposition groups.\n<\/p>\n<p>\nSince March 2011, Amnesty International has closely  monitored and documented the Syrian authorities&rsquo; crackdown on opposition and  repeatedly condemned the authorities&rsquo; widespread as well as systematic attacks  on the civilian population, which amount to crimes against humanity and, since  2012, war crimes in some instances.  This briefing looks at serious abuses, some amounting to war crimes, committed  by the burgeoning number of armed opposition groups operating in Syria,  focusing mainly on summary killings.\n<\/p>\n<p>\nThe main targets for these summary killings are members of  the various government armed and security forces, the shadowy pro-government  militias known as <em>shabiha<\/em>, as well as suspected informers or  collaborators (widely referred to by the opposition as <em>mukhbireen and  &lsquo;awayniyeh<\/em>). Many were civilians, including journalists working for  pro-government media and members of minority communities perceived by members  of armed opposition groups as loyal to President Bashar al-Assad such as Shi&rsquo;a  or Alawite Muslims, although not all members of such communities are in fact  pro-government.\n<\/p>\n<p>\nIn some cases, Amnesty International has been unable to  determine which armed opposition group was responsible for particular summary  killings. Several groups may have been active in the city, town, village or  neighbourhood at the time of the killing. Some witnesses and relatives of  victims are understandably reluctant to provide detailed information about the  armed group for fear of retaliation. Verification has also been hindered by the  lack of access to cities where killings are happening because of the dire  security situation. However, the evidence  gathered by Amnesty International, and the cases it has been able to verify,  leave no doubt that armed opposition groups are responsible for a large number  of summary killings and other egregious crimes.  In addition to research conducted since the conflict began, including the  examination of scores of videos showing alleged abuses by armed opposition  groups since 2011, Amnesty International interviewed Syrians as well as  Palestinian refugees previously resident in Syria in Lebanon in December 2012  and January 2013. They included residents of several Syrian towns and cities  mainly in southern areas near Lebanon, as well as activists, citizen  journalists, witnesses, survivors and relatives of victims; and followed this  up with other research and interviews.\n<\/p>\n<p>\nIn addition to summary killings, various armed opposition  groups including some affiliated to the FSA, are committing other war crimes  and serious human rights abuses, including indiscriminate attacks which have  led to civilian casualties; use of children in a military capacity; torture or  other ill-treatment of captives; sectarian threats and attacks against minority  communities perceived as pro-government; abductions and the holding of  hostages. These are briefly highlighted below.\n<\/p>\n<p>\n<strong>Indiscriminate attacks and reckless use of weapons <\/strong><br \/>\nSome armed opposition groups have unlawfully killed  civilians as a result of attacks in which they failed to take the necessary  precautions to minimize civilian casualties. For example, 13 prisoners were  reportedly killed mistakenly on 21 January 2012 in Idlib governorate by an  armed group linked to the FSA.  The group was said to have detonated an improvised explosive device in a  military van transporting the prisoners as the group thought the van was  carrying members of the security forces. Also, civilians have reportedly been  killed or injured as a result of armed opposition groups preparing and storing munitions  and explosives in residential buildings and the presence of fighters and  military objectives from all parties within residential areas has further  heightened the risk of harm to the civilian population. In some cases, members  of armed opposition groups are using imprecise weapons such as artillery and  mortars in or close to densely populated neighbourhoods, needlessly endangering  the lives of civilians. For example, an armed opposition group fired mortars at  the Presidential palace in Damascus on 6 November 2012. The shells missed their  target and fell on a residential area mainly inhabited by Alawite Muslims close  to the palace known as Mezzeh 86. At least three civilians were reported to  have been killed.<br \/>\n<strong>Use of children <\/strong><br \/>\nAmnesty International has other concerns about actions of  armed opposition groups in Syria. Some of these groups appear, for instance, to  be using child soldiers militarily in the conflict, albeit predominantly in  support roles. Children should be prohibited from joining the fighting, even  when they volunteer to do so and even in an auxiliary capacity such as acting  as messengers. <br \/>\n<strong>Torture and ill-treatment of captives <\/strong><br \/>\nAmnesty International has reviewed numerous videos of  captured soldiers and security personnel or those suspected of being informers  or collaborators in which the captured individuals appear to have injuries  which may have been caused through torture or other ill-treatment. Although  such videos are difficult to corroborate, taken together they raise serious  concerns that many armed opposition groups in Syria are torturing or otherwise  ill-treating captured individuals. Additionally, some of these videos show  captured individuals actually being tortured or otherwise ill-treated by their  captors, such as Colonels Fou&rsquo;ad Abd al-Rahman and Izz al-Din Badr (see below  in section on summary killings).<br \/>\nIn another case, video evidence emerged in late October 2012  that appeared to show an armed group, reportedly at a checkpoint near Saraqeb  in Idlib province, beating and kicking at least 10 men, who are believed to be  captured members of the security forces, before members of the armed group fire  on them and kill them.  It is unknown how many were killed, but media outlets and a Syrian NGO say that  at least 28 died. Amnesty International asked a specialist organization to  authenticate the footage. The location and time of filming were confirmed, but  Amnesty International has so far been unable to confirm the identity of the  armed group and no group has yet claimed responsibility. The UN commented on  the incident, stating that it appeared to be a war crime.<br \/>\nOn 10 August 2012, a four-person crew from Syria&rsquo;s state TV  channel Ikhbariya &ndash; news presenter Yara al-Saleh, cameraman Abdullah Tubara,  assistant cameraman Hatem Abu Yehyeh and their driver Hussam Imad &ndash; were  abducted in al-Tal in the northern suburbs of Damascus by an armed opposition  group affiliated with the FSA. The four were held for six days without contact  with the outside world, and allegedly tortured, including beatings with hands  and in at least one case a belt. <br \/>\n<strong>Sectarian threats and attacks <\/strong><br \/>\nThe majority of Syria&rsquo;s population is Sunni Muslim;  minorities such as Alawite Muslims (to which the ruling al-Assad family  belongs); Shi&rsquo;a Muslims  and Christians are often seen by the opposition as being pro-government and  indeed, in some areas, &ldquo;Popular Committees&rdquo; have been armed by the state since  mid-2012 and are reported to be involved in some instances of carrying out  gross abuses. However,  not all members of these communities are pro-government, and some have openly  supported the uprising and opposition.<br \/>\nOver the months, reports have mounted of opposition groups  threatening such minority communities. Since the early stages of the uprising,  protesters at some demonstrations held against the government shouted sectarian  slogans, such as: &ldquo;Christians to Beirut and Alawites to the grave.&rdquo; Amnesty  International has also learned that this slogan was written on walls in Aleppo  in areas taken over by armed opposition groups in July 2012. <br \/>\nAmnesty International&rsquo;s research indicates that there have  been attacks by armed opposition groups that have targeted members of  minorities loyal to or perceived to be loyal to the government, including  abductions and summary killings. Some victims of such attacks were perceived to  be informers, or collaborators, or members of pro-government militias. In other  cases, including some documented in this briefing, information available to  Amnesty International indicates there has been no suggestion that victims of  summary killings or abductions were informers or collaborators and it is highly  likely that they were targeted on account of their sectarian identity. <br \/>\nIn some of these summary killings, the victims may have been  abducted and killed by armed opposition groups simply because they belonged to  a minority perceived as loyal to President al-Assad and were living in  predominantly anti-government areas, making them easily accessible targets.  Such killings, along with threats such as those referred to above, have  prompted many in these minority communities to flee, either abroad or to areas  in Syria where they felt less threatened. <br \/>\n<strong>Abductions and hostage taking <\/strong><br \/>\nMany individuals &ndash; including captured personnel and  civilians &#8211; have been detained by armed opposition groups, including some  linked to the FSA. Some appear to have been abducted and held without evidence  that they are suspected of committing abuses or crimes. In many cases, the  motivation appears to have been to hold the individuals as hostages in order to  secure a ransom for their release or to try to force other parties to carry out  specified acts such as to release prisoners. These have included people  captured apparently because of their nationality, including Iranian nationals;  their sectarian identity, notably Alawite or Shi&rsquo;a Muslims (including foreign  nationals); or their political views, notably for belonging to the ruling  Ba&#8217;ath Party or for otherwise supporting the Syrian government. <br \/>\nFor example, 48 Iranian hostages held since August 2012 by the al-Baraa&rsquo; Brigade  &ndash; an armed opposition group reportedly affiliated with the FSA which says that  it operates in Damascus and its suburbs &#8211; were released in January 2013  apparently in exchange for the release of 2,130 civilians held by the Syrian  authorities. Prior to  their release, members of the al-Baraa&rsquo; brigade had released a video on 4  October 2012 in which they threatened to kill the Iranian nationals if the  Syrian authorities did not release detained opposition supporters and did not  stop the shelling and killing of civilians within 48 hours. A spokesperson for  the Revolutionary Military Council in Damascus Province, part of the FSA,  announced on 8 October 2012 that the executions had been postponed pending  ongoing negotiations. <br \/>\nNine of 11 Lebanese Shi&rsquo;a Muslim men abducted on their  return from a visit to Shi&rsquo;a holy sites in Iran remain held at the time of  writing by the &#8216;Asifat al-Shimal Brigade, an armed opposition group operating  in northern Syria close to the Turkish border. After their capture, the &lsquo;Asifat  al-Shimal Brigade made several demands in exchange for the release of the men. Two of the 11 have been  released through external mediation and have returned to Lebanon. <br \/>\nThese serious abuses of human rights by armed opposition groups,  some of which amount to war crimes, are continuing despite the signing in  August 2012 by several leaders of FSA-affiliated armed groups, including the  heads of the Military Councils of Homs, al-Qusayr, Deir al-Zour and al-Suwayda,  of the Local Coordination Committees&rsquo; Code of Conduct. By signing this document  they promised, among other things, to respect human rights in accordance with  religious precepts and international human rights law; to treat captives in  accordance with the standard rules for the treatment of prisoners; not to  torture or ill-treat prisoners; not to carry out acts of revenge fuelled by  race, sect, religion or any other issues; and &#8211; in the event that the groups  violated the provisions of the code of conduct &#8211; to accept fair accountability  by specialised committees established under the supervision of the FSA&rsquo;s  leadership and monitored by independent human rights activists. <br \/>\nHowever, the patterns of war crimes and other serious human  rights abuses documented in this briefing by Amnesty International and by other  human rights monitors suggest that this Code is more honoured in the breach  than the observance.  These crimes &ndash; which are being committed with impunity &#8211; highlight the urgent  need for all armed opposition groups operating in Syria to adhere strictly to  the legally binding rules of international humanitarian law and for commanders  to act swiftly to condemn and stop abuses. The patterns of abuse also highlight  the need for countries providing assistance to armed opposition groups in  Syria, or considering an increase in logistical or other support, to ensure  that military supplies are not being used to commit violations of international  humanitarian law and to exert pressure on the opposition&rsquo;s political and  military leadership to commit to upholding principles of international  humanitarian law in their military operations. <br \/>\n<strong>SUMMARY KILLINGS<\/strong> <br \/>\nSummary killings by armed opposition groups of captured  members of the armed forces and security apparatuses, the government-backed <em>shabiha<\/em> militias, as well as suspected informers and collaborators, and civilians,  including journalists working for pro-government media and some who may have  been targeted simply because they belonged to communities perceived as loyal to  President al-Assad began mere months after the beginning of the uprising in  Syria in February 2011. Numbers of such unlawful killings have risen since the  beginning of 2012 as the situation gradually evolved into an armed conflict  which has spread across much of the country.<br \/>\n<strong>Captured soldiers and members of pro-government militia <\/strong><br \/>\nFrequently targeted for summary killings have been captured  soldiers or members of the pro-government <em>shabiha<\/em> militias which are  armed by the state. Some fighters for FSA-affiliated armed groups who have  spoken to Amnesty International say captured soldiers found to &lsquo;have blood on  their hands&rsquo; or to have taken part in killings of fighters or civilians are  usually killed. One armed opposition commander linked to the FSA who was active  in the Homs governorate and the Damascus suburbs told Amnesty International that out of every 10  captured soldiers, around six would be usually killed. He went on:<br \/>\n<em>&ldquo;When we were still in control of Baba Amr, every time we  killed a captured soldier or officer, we kept his military ID, his cell phone,  and other possessions all in a safe place. The soldier would be buried in  Basateen Baba Amr [Baba Amr&rsquo;s orchards]. But in the last few months, we stopped  being as organized&hellip; the government started using air strikes, so we have to  leave the battlefield as quickly as possible&hellip; and captured soldiers would slow  us down. So [the FSA] would just kill them on the site and leave.&rdquo;<\/em> <br \/>\nOne armed group that announces in public statements at least  some of the summary killings it carries out is Jabhat al-Nusra. For example, on 12 June  2012, Jabhat al-Nusra said in a statement that it had &lsquo;executed&rsquo; four <em>shabiha<\/em> members in eastern Syria;  on 15 October 2012, it said it had killed eight people, of which two were  reported in the public statement to have &ldquo;confessed&rdquo; to crimes attributed to  them suggesting that they were captured and then summarily killed. The  statement said about a third man that he was taken from his home and then  killed.<br \/>\nJabhat al-Nusra statements make sectarian references to the  &ldquo;Nuseiri enemy,&rdquo; a  reference to Alawite Muslims of whom they disapprove. In other statements by  the Islamist armed group, government soldiers are referred to as &ldquo;Nuseiris&rdquo;  and\/ or apostates. <br \/>\n<strong>Colonel Fou&rsquo;ad Abd al-Rahman<\/strong> and <strong>Colonel Izz  al-Din Badr<\/strong>, for example, were abducted by an armed opposition group on 16  August 2012 in Deir al-Zour where, according to their families, they were  involved in a military course required for students at al-Furat University. <br \/>\nBoth families  interviewed by Amnesty International separately said that the abductors  introduced themselves as members of an armed opposition group called the &lsquo;Osoud  al-Tawhid Battalion&rsquo;. They called both families between one to three days after  the abduction and asked for a ransom. Colonel Abd al-Rahman&rsquo;s family said that  they had been allowed to speak to him at least once, and that he said he was  being tortured and urged them to secure the ransom his abductors had asked for.  At one point, the main abductor negotiating with the two families told Colonel  Badr&rsquo;s wife that he was no longer holding her husband and that he had handed  him and Colonel Abd al-Rahman over to the &ldquo;religious committees&rdquo; (<em>al-lijan  al-shar&rsquo;iya<\/em>), which have taken on a quasi-judicial role in some opposition  held areas including Deir al-Zour.  She told Amnesty International:<br \/>\n<em>&ldquo;I told the abductor that my husband did not go to Deir  al-Zour to fight, he&rsquo;s just like an employee doing his job at the university&hellip;  He said, &lsquo;if [the religious committees] find that your husband had committed a  wrongdoing, then he shall be killed. If not, then there shouldn&rsquo;t be a  problem&rsquo;.&rdquo;<\/em> <br \/>\nThe negotiations continued sporadically with both families.  Then one of the abductors told Colonel Badr&rsquo;s wife that she should not keep  working on her husband&rsquo;s case because he and Colonel Abd al-Rahman had been  killed and buried in al-Hamidiyeh Garden in Deir al-Zour. A few days later,  video footage of the killing of both captive officers emerged. <br \/>\nOne of the relatives of Colonel Abd al-Rahman explained what  happened next: <br \/>\n&ldquo;[Two or three months later after his capture], <em>we saw  footage of him [Colonel Fou&rsquo;ad Abd al-Rahman] as he was being beheaded that was  aired on Sama TV and on the internet. That&rsquo;s how we knew that they had killed  him.&rdquo;<\/em> <br \/>\nColonel Fou&rsquo;ad Abd al-Rahman&rsquo;s widow described that terrible  moment:<br \/>\n<em>&ldquo;It was around 11am. My daughter [aged 21] shouted to me,  &lsquo;mum, come and see dad&hellip; quick.&rsquo; He was on TV&hellip; as he was shown being killed, I  pushed my daughter away to block her from viewing the scene&hellip; but she did see.  She had a nervous breakdown&hellip; she&rsquo;s become so volatile, she&rsquo;s traumatized&hellip; it&rsquo;s  not easy to see her father in that way&hellip; We now want his body back, and we want  those who did this to be held accountable.&rdquo; <\/em><br \/>\nThe first footage of the killing emerged in November 2012  showing two captive men on a sofa in a room. One of them, wearing a light blue  shirt, was identified by his family to Amnesty International as Colonel Fou&rsquo;ad  Abd al-Rahman; the other, wearing a dark shirt, was identified by his family as  Colonel Izz al-Din Badr. The captives are surrounded by men, some accusing them  of killing children. At least two men start slapping the captives on the head.  Voices of other men can be heard asking the assailants to stop. The captives  are then taken outside by the crowd, including armed men, and voices can be  heard saying: &ldquo;No one should film&rdquo;. Later, another voice can be heard saying,  &ldquo;We killed 80 people&rdquo;. As Colonel Izz al-Din Badr is being prepared for death,  a man can be heard shouting: &ldquo;People&rsquo;s enemy&hellip; May God curse you, you Alawites,  you dogs.&rdquo; Colonel Badr is ordered to lie on the ground face down, put his  hands behind his back and place his head on a rectangular stone. An armed man  passing in front of the camera says, &ldquo;Don&rsquo;t waste one bullet on these dogs&rdquo;. A boy  holding a machete is standing nearby and a man can be heard saying, &ldquo;He doesn&rsquo;t  have the strength.&rdquo; The child then strikes the man on the neck to cheers from  the crowd. Then at least one person shoots at the body around six times. <br \/>\nColonel Fou&rsquo;ad Abd al-Rahman is made to lie near the first  victim and place his head on a similar rectangular stone. A man struck his neck  with a machete and then several shots were fired at the body. The victims were  then decapitated using a machete. The severed head of Colonel Fou&rsquo;ad Abd  al-Rahman was placed on his back. Another shorter video from a different angle  was uploaded on Youtube in December 2012 of the same incident showing the boy  striking the neck of Colonel Badr twice, and then showing both decapitated  heads placed on the back of the headless bodies.<br \/>\nAmnesty International asked four Syrian nationals separately  to check the dialect of the men heard speaking on the video. All four said the  dialect sounded like that spoken in Deir al-Zour or other areas in eastern Syria.  A Europe-based human rights organization specializing in Syria told Amnesty  International that its source in Deir al-Zour reported that the killings had  taken place in al-&lsquo;Ommal neighbourhood in Deir al-Zour. Such information is  consistent with both families&rsquo; claim that the two men were being held in Deir  al-Zour. <br \/>\nColonel Fou&rsquo;ad Abd al-Rahman, from the village of Qarfess  near the city of Jableh in the governorate of Latakia, was the father of two  sons and three daughters aged between 13 and 23. Colonel Izz al-Din Badr from  the village of Dahr Barakat near Jableh has three children aged between 10 and  15. <strong>Colonel Helal  Eid<\/strong>, an army officer specializing in physical education who lived in  al-Taqadom neighbourhood in al-Yarmouk, southern Damascus, was summarily killed  in August or September 2012 allegedly by members of one of the armed opposition  groups present in al-Hajar al-Aswad, south of al-Yarmouk. Around 15 members of  the brigade came to Nimrin Street in al-Taqadom and headed straight for the building  where Colonel Helal Eid lived, according to a neighbour. The neighbour told Amnesty International: <br \/>\n<em>&ldquo;They said they wanted him because he was a  &lsquo;collaborator&rsquo;. They went up to his flat, knocked on his door and asked him to  open the door. He was with his wife and children and he refused to open the  door. They threw a sound bomb on the door, but he didn&rsquo;t open. They fired  bullets at the door while his wife and children were inside. He was hit and  wounded in his shoulder so he opened the door. <\/em><br \/>\n<em>As they were taking him away, a crowd of around 30  people, mainly neighbours, intervened asking the armed group to leave him.  People explained to the fighters that he&rsquo;d been living amongst them peacefully  for many years. The fighters replied: &lsquo;We want to ask him a few questions and  we&rsquo;ll let him go.&rsquo; They put him in a pick-up vehicle and took him away in the  direction of al-Hajar al-Aswad. <\/em><br \/>\n<em>A few hours later, a boy came to the neighbourhood and  asked us: &lsquo;Do you know Colonel Helal Eid?&rsquo; We said, &lsquo;Yes&rsquo;. The boy said: &lsquo;He is  dumped in the Tirbeh al-Jadideh&rsquo; <\/em>[at the end of al-Yarmouk campand  near al-Hajar al-Aswad]<em>. <\/em><br \/>\n<em>We immediately went there and found him on a heap of  waste, with a bullet hole in the middle of his forehead, a firearm injury to  his chest, and the firearm injury to the shoulder that he received at his home  before his surrender&hellip;His knee was broken&hellip; A brown card was on him with the  words: &lsquo;the collaborator Colonel Helal Eid&rsquo;.&rdquo;<\/em>Elsewhere,  fighters, reportedly belonging to the Baba Amr Revolutionaries&rsquo; Brigade,  supported by Baba Amr Martyrs Brigade and al-Khadraa&rsquo; Brigade, all reportedly  linked to the FSA launched an attack in mid-June 2012 on the Kfar &lsquo;Aya  checkpoint in Homs. They captured at least one officer and three soldiers and summarily killed at  least two of them the following day, according to an opposition commander who  participated in the battle. He told Amnesty International what had happened:<br \/>\n<em>&ldquo;When I arrived, the fighting had already begun. The FSA  was advancing and eventually controlled all of the [Kfar &lsquo;Aya] checkpoint and  surrounding buildings. I saw some fighters had already captured three young  soldiers. I continued on my way&#8230; I remember the captain&rsquo;s assistant was found  hiding between the fortifications. Some FSA fighters saw him and as they tried  to capture him, he ran and jumped off the third floor and died. We tried to go  to the school that is next to the checkpoint to make sure that there were no  soldiers hiding there, but the army was firing mortar rounds at us and we  couldn&rsquo;t do that. I was injured at this moment and I had to retreat&hellip; While  leaving, someone told us that the captain had surrendered&#8230; <\/em><br \/>\n<em>&ldquo;I went back to our position in Sultaniyeh and found the  three young soldiers [captured earlier] there. One told us that he used to give  grenades to an FSA officer&hellip;The other two confessed that they had taken part in  harassing and stealing from families stopped at the checkpoint&#8230; These two  [soldiers] were Sunni Muslims from Aleppo. [The FSA] killed them. They were  captured in the afternoon or early evening and they were killed the following  morning. The third joined the FSA. <\/em><br \/>\n<em>&ldquo;The captain told us he was a Sunni from Deir al-Zour,  probably so that we&rsquo;d have mercy on him. We called his family to see if they  can help us in negotiating to swap him with our prisoners held by the [Syrian]  authorities&hellip; His mother pleaded with us over the phone not to kill him. I felt  sorry for her and told my colleagues that we shouldn&rsquo;t have informed the  family&#8230; When it was clear to us that the state was unwilling to negotiate  with us to swap him&hellip; [the FSA] killed him.&rdquo;<\/em> <br \/>\nAnother video appears to show the summary killings of  alleged <em>shabiha<\/em> members by al-Tawhid Brigade in Aleppo. The video,  released on 31 July 2012, shows a few men from the Berri clan (Sunni Muslims  well known for acting on behalf of government forces), including one of their  leaders, <strong>Ali Zein al-&lsquo;Abdeen Berri (known as Zayno Berri)<\/strong>, being shot  dead by members of the Tawhid Brigade that day. They had just been ordered out  of a clan &ldquo;hospitality&rdquo; building by the fighters in the Bab al-Nairab  neighbourhood of Aleppo, an area that was at the time under the control of FSA.  A separate video uploaded the same day shows 14 men from the al-Berri clan  shortly after their capture. Most of them appeared to have been beaten on the  face. A local human rights activist told Amnesty International that the 14  members of the clan were summarily killed, some of them by hanging, although  this was not shown in the video. Fahad al-Masri, the FSA&rsquo;s Head of Central Media,  condemned the killings in a televised interview with the BBC Arabic service on  1 August 2012, saying  that the FSA had opened an investigation into the incident and that those  responsible would be held to account under a new government. The outcome of this  investigation is yet to be made known. In September 2012 a Tawhid Brigade  commander in Aleppo told Amnesty International that in his opinion the killing  of the members of the Berri clan was justified, claiming that the clan members  had been responsible for deaths of civilians. However, under international  humanitarian law, the killing of captured individuals by a party to an armed  conflict is a war crime, for which those responsible should be held  accountable. <br \/>\n<strong>Suspected informers <\/strong><br \/>\nAmnesty International&rsquo;s research indicates that many victims  of summary killings by armed opposition groups were suspected of being  informers or collaborators with the government. <br \/>\nIn July 2012, there appears to have been a rise in summary  killings by armed opposition groups in the area of al-Tadamon neighbourhood,  east of al-Yarmouk, where several armed opposition groups had a significant  presence. In an area south of al-Tadamon, a large hole dug for the foundations  of a building in Souk al-Talata was apparently used by armed opposition groups  to dump bodies of people they had summarily killed. Four witnesses interviewed  separately by Amnesty International  said that dead bodies appeared in the &ldquo;hole of death&rdquo; between July and August  2012. A fifth witness could not remember the months during which he saw the  bodies in the hole.  Residents frequently checked the hole, apparently 15m long, 6m wide and 5-7m  deep, to see if further bodies had been dumped there. <br \/>\n<strong>Ali al-Zamel<\/strong>, a Palestinian refugee accused by armed  opposition groups of acting as an informer for the Syrian authorities, was  abducted in July 2012 and killed around five days later, according to one of  the five witnesses who saw his dumped body in the &ldquo;hole of death&rdquo;. One of the  witnesses told Amnesty International:<br \/>\n<em>&ldquo;Someone called me and told me [armed opposition  fighters] had killed Ali al-Zamel&hellip; so we went to the hole. I saw his body, it  had a firearm wound to the chest and another to his neck.&rdquo; <\/em><br \/>\nOn 3 August 2012, a resident secretly filmed at the &ldquo;hole of  death&rdquo; the killing of a man by three men, whom he identified as members of  Jabhat al-Nusra. The witness  said that he started filming after several men got out of a car near the hole,  dragging a blindfolded man. The footage seen by Amnesty International shows the blindfolded man  wearing shorts and a shirt that was so torn that bluish-purple bruises on his  upper body were visible. The man is forced by three men, one carrying a rifle,  to sit closer to the edge of the hole. Then his body slumps forward and falls  down the slope. The footage then shows the victim lying face-down, apparently  at the bottom of the hole. One of the three men removes the cloth from around  the victim&rsquo;s head and shoots at his head from close range, and then shoots one  more time before stepping back. The video ends with the victim lying still. The  witness did not know the identity of the victim. <br \/>\nAnother resident, who said he visited the &ldquo;hole of death&rdquo;  three times in July 2012, described what he had seen to Amnesty International:<br \/>\n<em>&ldquo;The first time, there were four bodies&hellip; two of them were  swollen, as if they had died several days earlier. The second time I went  there, the security situation was tense so I couldn&rsquo;t get close. I stood around  20 metres away and could see the body of a dead man at the edge of the hole,  stuck at around half a metre deep. The third time, there were three dead bodies  of men, all of them with bullet wounds to the head. One of the three bodies was  swollen.&rdquo; <\/em><br \/>\nThree of these residents who had left Syria in September and  October 2012 told Amnesty International that when the Syrian army regained  control of al-Tadamon, it recovered bodies from the hole around September 2012.  Amnesty International has been unable to clarify the number of bodies recovered  or where they were taken. <br \/>\nIn mid-October 2012, Jabhat al-Nusra and other armed groups  drove the Syrian army out of al-Tadamon and regained control of it and Souk  al-Talata. No new dead bodies had been thrown in the hole while the area was  under army control or after the armed opposition groups regained control,  according to residents who sought refuge abroad, including one who left Syria  in late January 2013. <br \/>\nIn Douma, east of Damascus, summary killings began with the  emergence of armed opposition groups in the city around three months after  government forces opened fire for the first time at peaceful protesters in  Douma, killing at least nine, on 1 April 2011. Information gathered by Amnesty  International indicates that summary killings by armed opposition groups,  including the Shuhadaa&rsquo; Douma Brigade, were frequent and increased  significantly as the situation evolved into an armed conflict. A relief worker  involved in transporting casualties of the conflict and treating the wounded  said that he collected dead bodies of people who had been summarily killed by  armed opposition groups. He told Amnesty International:<br \/>\n<em>&ldquo;In July and August 2011, one man was &lsquo;executed&rsquo; around  every two weeks&#8230; We would go and pick them up. The most common reason given  for the killings was that the victim served as an informer for the security.  The number of those &lsquo;executed&rsquo; gradually increased to one every week, then two  or three every week. By July 2012, three to four people were being &lsquo;executed&rsquo;  every day, and we stopped knowing the exact accusation. People just referred to  them as informers. <\/em><br \/>\n<em>&ldquo;The most dead bodies of victims of summary killings that  I helped recover was seven. That was in the summer of 2012. I remember an  [opposition fighter linked to the FSA] came to us and told us there are seven  &lsquo;suffocated&rsquo; <\/em>[&lsquo;fatayes&rsquo;, a derogatory term used for the dead]<em> that  needed to be removed. I went to the location and they were shot in the head,  neck and back. They also had clear marks of torture on them: bruising, burns,  knife scratches and stabbing. What we would usually do was to collect the  bodies and take them to the National Hospital&hellip; I didn&rsquo;t know what happened  afterwards.&rdquo; <\/em><br \/>\n<strong>Killings of civilians, including journalists and members  of minorities perceived as loyal to President al-Assad <\/strong><br \/>\nAmong civilians killed have been several journalists who  worked for state-run or pro- government media. For example, in early August  2012, Jabhat al-Nusra claimed to have killed TV presenter <strong>Mohamed Saeed<\/strong>,  whom its members had abducted in mid-July. <strong>Maya Nasser<\/strong> was shot dead on 26 September 2012 in Damascus apparently by  an opposition sniper while reporting live for Press TV, a station owned by the  Iranian government. He had received threatening calls in the weeks prior to his  killing. While no armed opposition group publicly claimed responsibility for  his killing, Facebook groups and pages aligned to the Syrian opposition and the  FSA posted news celebrating the &ldquo;squashing of the <em>media shabih<\/em> Maya  Nasser&rdquo;. <br \/>\nThe surviving members of the abducted Ikhbariya crew [see  above] say that cameraman <strong>Hatem Abu Yehyeh<\/strong> was not killed in shelling by  government forces as claimed by the armed opposition group which abducted them,  but was summarily executed by the armed group on the first day of captivity. Ikhbariya&rsquo;s headquarters in  the town of Drousha, about 15 miles south of Damascus had itself been attacked  earlier by an armed group in June 2012, leading to the killing of three  journalists and four security workers, according to the state news agency SANA.  Several representatives of the opposition claimed publicly that members of  armed opposition groups or defectors carried out the attack.<br \/>\nIn at least some cases, members of minorities appear to have  been targeted by armed opposition groups for abduction and\/or summary killing.  The killings described below relate to specific cases of members of the Shi&rsquo;a  Muslim minority killed in Homs and the surrounding area, which Amnesty International documented in  interviews with Shi&rsquo;a Muslims who used to live in al-Bayada as well as fighters  from armed opposition groups affiliated to the FSA and other opposition  activists from (or who have operated from) Homs. <br \/>\nShortly after the start of the uprising, tensions in Homs  grew between members of the majority Sunni Muslim community and minorities  living in the city, particularly Alawite and Shi&rsquo;a Muslims. As pro- and  anti-government armed groups were formed by both sides, al-Zahra neighbourhood,  a predominantly Alawite Muslim residential area, turned into a stronghold for  the pro-government <em>shabiha<\/em> militia while armed opposition groups (many  of which later became part of the FSA upon its formation) controlled  predominantly Sunni Muslim neighbourhoods such as Baba Amr, Bab al-Saba&rsquo;,  al-Bayada and others. <br \/>\nSome of the Shi&rsquo;a Muslims targeted may have been suspected  of being &ldquo;informers&rdquo; or &ldquo;collaborators&rdquo; or members of <em>shabiha<\/em> militias  by armed opposition groups. However, Amnesty International found that some of  the killings targeting Shi&rsquo;a Muslim residents of Homs in 2011 may have been  carried out because armed opposition groups found them easy targets at a time  when capturing well-protected soldiers or <em>shabiha<\/em> was too difficult or  risky. The organization fears that some of the summary killings of civilians  have taken place solely on account of their sectarian identity, as documented  in the three cases below, where Amnesty International found no evidence that  those killed were suspected of being informers, collaborators or members of <em>shabiha<\/em> militias. <br \/>\nOpposition fighters or activists closely associated with  them or their supporters have attempted to justify such killings to Amnesty  International either by claims that every person killed summarily was  themselves guilty of killings or by making derogatory statements about these  minorities&rsquo; support for the government or by acknowledging what they said were  &lsquo;mistakes&rsquo; or &lsquo;abuses&rsquo; committed by the opposition. However, no such reasons  can be accepted for such killings which are gross human rights abuses and, when  carried out by parties to an armed conflict, are war crimes.<br \/>\nThe first known summary killing of a Shi&rsquo;a Muslim man in  Homs who may have been targeted on account of his identity that Amnesty  International is aware of is that of <strong>Rida Drei&rsquo;<\/strong>, a 31-year-old resident  of al-Bayada, who was abducted early on 24 July 2011. His body was found the  next day. A family member told Amnesty International what had happened:<br \/>\n<em>&ldquo;My family and I had already left al-Bayada&hellip; Rida stayed  because he had a supermarket there and felt that he didn&rsquo;t need to. At one  point, he told me he felt uneasy, especially at night when crowds gather and  sentiments ran high, and sometimes they would shoot in the air&hellip; On 24 July, he  left his home at around 6am as usual&hellip; to buy bread for his supermarket from two  bakeries, one in al-Bayada and the second in Deir Ba&rsquo;albe [in Homs]. He did not  come back. &hellip; We looked for him all day and night to no avail. The following  day, we found his body in al-Birr wa al-Khadamat Hospital in al-Wa&rsquo;er [Homs].&rdquo; <\/em><br \/>\nThe family member said he saw the body of Rida Drei&rsquo; and it  had a bullet wound in the upper neck, cuts to the head and nose, and bruised  lips. His car was found burned at Tal al-Nasr graveyard. <br \/>\nOther summary killings apparently targeting Shi&rsquo;a Muslim  residents followed, prompting more families to leave. One victim was <strong>Nizam  al-Abbeer<\/strong>, aged 45, who was killed on 3 September 2011. A relative told  Amnesty International  that as Nizam al-Abbeer walked towards his home in al-Bayada, armed men tried  to drag him into their car but he escaped. The assailants then shot him dead. A  few days later, his son was injured when men in a passing car shot at him as  his family was preparing to leave al-Bayada. <br \/>\nOn 5 February 2012, nine members of the Helal family were  summarily killed, allegedly by FSA fighters, at Hooreen Farm in al-Ghantoo, a  village south of al-Rastan, Homs governorate. Members of the extended family,  comprising 32 smaller families, were the only Shi&rsquo;a Muslims living in  al-Ghantoo, according to Helal Helal, father of four of the victims. The family  had lived there for decades. The victims were Helal Helal&rsquo;s sons <strong>Diab Helal  Helal<\/strong>, aged 24, twins <strong>Ali Helal Helal<\/strong> and <strong>Hassan Helal Helal<\/strong>,  aged 22, and <strong>Ahmed Helal Helal<\/strong>, aged 18; his brother <strong>Ali Diab Helal<\/strong>,  and his son <strong>Taleb Ali Helal<\/strong>, aged 18; his son-in-law, <strong>Hammoudi Awad  Helal<\/strong>, aged 33 and his brothers <strong>Ja&rsquo;afar Awad Helal<\/strong>, aged 34, and <strong>Abbas  Awad Helal<\/strong>, aged 29. Helal Helal told Amnesty International what happened  that day:<br \/>\n<em>&ldquo;It was 3pm and we had come back home after work to drink  tea with the family&hellip; Suddenly, we saw a large group of armed men, some of them  from our village&hellip; those who call themselves revolutionaries. They surrounded  the house. We were sitting in the ground floor. So the men went up to the first  floor to hide while I stayed with the women and children&hellip; They [the armed men]  entered the room and everyone was terrified, the children were terrified. They  ordered my son&rsquo;s wife to remove the gold bracelets she was wearing. She said  they were too tight and that she couldn&rsquo;t. So one said: &lsquo;Give them to me, or  I&rsquo;ll cut off your hand and take them.&rsquo; So she had to take them off and hand  them to him&hellip; Other armed men had gone up to the first floor and brought my sons  and the others downstairs&hellip; My son, Ali, clung to me and asked me not to let  them take him&hellip; I told him, &lsquo;I don&rsquo;t have arms to protect you, just go with  them&rsquo;. They took them outside, and we were watching from the window&hellip; They  opened fire on them&hellip; I heard one saying to the others, &lsquo;Come and try your  rifles&rsquo;. They shot some more&hellip; We were all screaming&hellip; We went outside and only  my nephew, Taleb, was still alive&hellip; We took him to the hospital but he died upon  arrival. He and the<\/em> <em>others, each one of them, had many shots on their  bodies. On the same day, we hurriedly left al-Ghantoo, all of us&hellip; The entire  Helal family, around 130 people, we all left and left everything behind&#8230; I  don&rsquo;t care if you give my name and number to everyone, it will not get worse. I  want the entire world to know what happened.&rdquo; <\/em><br \/>\nThese three cases and other evidence collected by Amnesty  International is insufficient for the organization to assess whether or not  summary killings by armed opposition groups solely on account of sectarian  identity have been widespread or systematic. However, the organization notes  that other human rights monitoring bodies have reported a rise in sectarian  attacks. For example, the UN independent international Commission of inquiry on  Syria concluded in its February 2013 report that &ldquo;[t]he conflict has become  increasingly sectarian, with the conduct of the parties becoming significantly  more radicalized and militarized.&rdquo;  <br \/>\n<strong>DISREGARD FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (LAWS OF  WAR) <\/strong><br \/>\nThe deliberate and summary killing of people in captivity &ndash;  be they soldiers, members of pro-government militias, police or intelligence  officials, or suspected government &ldquo;informers&rdquo; or &ldquo;collaborators&rdquo; &ndash; is a  flagrant and serious violation of international humanitarian law and  constitutes a war crime.  Of particular relevance to this briefing are the war crimes of murder, cruel  treatment and torture committed against individuals in detention.<br \/>\nInternational humanitarian law applies in situations of  armed conflict. In Syria, there is currently a non-international armed conflict  between forces loyal to the Syrian government and armed groups opposed to it,  so the rules of international humanitarian law apply and are binding on all parties  to the conflict, including non-state armed groups &#8211; those affiliated to the FSA  and others which are not affiliated to it. The laws of war contain the rules  and principles that seek to protect anyone who is not actively participating in  hostilities: notably civilians and anyone, including those who were previously  participating in hostilities, who is wounded or surrenders or is otherwise  captured. They set out standards of humane conduct and limit the means and  methods of conducting military operations. <br \/>\nUnder international criminal law, individuals, whether  civilians or members of the military, can be held criminally responsible for  certain violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses.  Leaders and commanders of armed groups must be particularly diligent in seeking  to prevent and repress such crimes. Military commanders and civilian superiors  can be held responsible for the acts of their subordinates. <br \/>\n<strong>RECOMMENDATIONS <\/strong><br \/>\n<strong>On arms transfers to armed opposition groups in Syria <\/strong><br \/>\nIn light of the abuses documented in this briefing, Amnesty  International urges any state considering supplying arms to armed opposition  groups in Syria to first carry out a rigorous human rights risk assessment and  establish a robust monitoring process which would enable all arms transfer  proposals to be carefully considered before any approval is granted. The  monitoring mechanism should recommend strong mitigation measures to be adopted  in relation to a potential recipient so as to remove any substantial risk the  arms would be misused for serious violations of international human rights law  or international humanitarian law. This mechanism should also allow for any  arms transfer subsequently approved to be rapidly halted should evidence emerge  that the arms are being or will be used to carry out serious human rights  abuses, or are being transferred or diverted to third parties. <br \/>\nThe mechanism should also include a system for limiting arms  supplied to only those weapons, munitions and related equipment which are not  inherently indiscriminate, such as anti-personnel land mines or cluster bombs. <br \/>\nThere should also be a system for ensuring that those who  receive the arms are first equipped with the practical knowledge and awareness  of international human rights and humanitarian law to understand their  obligations to uphold the relevant standards and their criminal liability under  international criminal law should they fail to do so. <br \/>\n<strong>To all armed opposition groups <\/strong><br \/>\nIn the face of the ongoing and flagrant violations of  international humanitarian law by armed opposition groups in Syria, Amnesty  International is calling on all such groups operating in Syria to: <br \/>\ncondemn publicly, and take action to stop, all human rights  abuses and violations of international humanitarian law, in particular summary  and other unlawful killings, abductions, hostage-taking, torture and other  ill-treatment, and forbid members from committing such acts in all  circumstances; <br \/>\ninform families of the fate of abducted relatives, including  those who have died, disclosing the circumstances of their deaths and the  location of their burial; <br \/>\nimmediately release any person held solely on the basis of  their religion, ethnicity, or political opinion and to cease holding any person  as a hostage;<br \/>\nremove from their ranks any member suspected of involvement  in summary killings and other abuses. <br \/>\n<strong>To all governments <\/strong><br \/>\nAmnesty International is also calling on all governments to:<br \/>\ncondemn human rights abuses by armed oppositions groups  including those affiliated to the FSA and others; <br \/>\naccept a shared responsibility to investigate and prosecute  crimes against humanity and other crimes under international law committed in  Syria or anywhere in the world. In particular, seek to exercise universal  jurisdiction over these crimes before national courts in fair trials and  without recourse to the death penalty;<br \/>\nas part of this shared responsibility, establish joint  international investigation and prosecution teams to investigate crimes under  international law committed in Syria to improve the effectiveness of  investigation, improve the chances of arrest and co-ordinate prosecutions.<br \/>\n<strong>To the UN Security Council <\/strong><br \/>\nFinally, the organization is calling on the UN Security  Council to:<br \/>\nrefer, as a matter of urgency, the situation in Syria to the  Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court for investigation of crimes  under international law;<br \/>\ndemand that the government of Syria grant prompt and  unfettered access to the independent international Commission of Inquiry,  humanitarian and human rights organizations, and to international media.<\/p>\n<p>Colonel Fou&rsquo;ad Abd al-Rahman. &copy; Private <br \/>\nArmed opposition groups not affiliated to the Free Syrian Army include a  variety of Islamist and jihadist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra. <br \/>\nThe  first such killing of which Amnesty International is aware was in July 2011,  before the situation in Syria was declared to have evolved into a  non-international armed conflict across much of the country in July 2012. <br \/>\nAmong Amnesty International&rsquo;s documentation of war crimes and other serious  human rights violations by Syria&rsquo;s government and pro-government forces are the  reports: Crackdown in Syria: Terror in Tell Kalakh, July 2011, Index: MDE  24\/029\/2011, http:\/\/www.amnesty.org\/en\/library\/info\/MDE24\/029\/2011\/en; Deadly  detention: Death in custody amid popular protest in Syria, August 2011, Index:  MDE 24\/035\/2011,   HYPERLINK &quot;http:\/\/www.amnesty.org\/en\/library\/info\/MDE24\/035\/2011\/en&quot; http:\/\/www.amnesty.org\/en\/library\/info\/MDE24\/035\/2011\/en; The long reach of the  mukhabaraat: violence and harassment against Syrians abroad and their families  back home, October 2011, Index: MDE 24\/057\/2011,  http:\/\/www.amnesty.org\/en\/library\/info\/MDE24\/057\/2011\/en; Health crisis: Syrian  government targets the wounded and health workers, October 2011, Index: MDE  25\/059\/2011, http:\/\/amnesty.org\/en\/library\/info\/MDE24\/059\/2011\/en; &ldquo;I wanted to  die&rdquo;: Syria&rsquo;s torture survivors speak out March 2012, Index: MDE 24\/016\/2012,  http:\/\/www.amnesty.org\/en\/library\/info\/MDE24\/016\/2012\/en; Deadly Reprisals:  Deliberate killings and other abuses by Syria&rsquo;s armed forces, June 2012, Index:  MDE 24\/041\/2012,   HYPERLINK &quot;http:\/\/www.amnesty.org\/en\/library\/info\/MDE24\/041\/2012\/en&quot; http:\/\/www.amnesty.org\/en\/library\/info\/MDE24\/041\/2012\/en; All-out Repression: Purging  dissent in Aleppo, Syria, August 2012, Index: MDE 24\/061\/2012,  HYPERLINK  &quot;http:\/\/www.amnesty.org\/en\/library\/info\/MDE24\/061\/2012\/en&quot; http:\/\/www.amnesty.org\/en\/library\/info\/MDE24\/061\/2012\/en, 23 August 2012; Civilians  bearing the brunt in the battle for Aleppo, August 2012, Index: MDE  24\/073\/2012,  HYPERLINK  &quot;http:\/\/www.amnesty.org\/en\/library\/info\/MDE24\/073\/2012\/en&quot; http:\/\/www.amnesty.org\/en\/library\/info\/MDE24\/073\/2012\/en; and Indiscriminate attacks  terrorize and displace civilians, 19 September 2012, Index: MDE 24\/078\/2012,  http:\/\/www.amnesty.org\/en\/library\/info\/MDE24\/078\/2012\/en <br \/>\nScores, if not hundreds, of armed opposition groups, composed of Syrian army  defectors and volunteers, are operating in many parts of Syria today. Many are  acting under the general banner of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) but in reality  are only loosely connected with the FSA and operate largely independently of  the FSA and of each other. Others have no link to the FSA at all. Amnesty  International is aware that not all members of armed opposition groups are  committing abuses. <br \/>\nSeveral alleged summary killings by opposition groups that Amnesty  International is aware of have been excluded from this briefing as insufficient  credible evidence has been gathered. However, the organization is continuing to  seek further information about these killings and will raise any concerns in  the future should sufficient information be obtained. At the same time, Amnesty  International is aware that some apparent abuses may be criminal acts carried  out by individuals or groups bearing arms who are not connected to the armed  opposition. <br \/>\nDue  to the serious human rights abuses, including war crimes, happening in Syria  every day, Amnesty International exercises extreme caution while collecting and  publicizing information on Syria and, where necessary, has not named or given  any other information in this briefing that may identify interviewees or put  people at risk. <br \/>\nInformation provided by a Syrian human rights organization. <br \/>\nSee  for example  HYPERLINK  &quot;http:\/\/uk.reuters.com\/video\/2012\/11\/08\/rebles-attack-mezzeh?videoId=238996235&quot;  http:\/\/uk.reuters.com\/video\/2012\/11\/08\/rebles-attack-mezzeh?videoId=238996235. The Syrian Observatory for  Human Rights reported that at least three civilians were killed in the attack. <br \/>\nAmnesty International, Syria: Armed group carries out summary killing of  security forces in Idlib, 1 November 2012.  http:\/\/www.amnesty.org\/en\/for-media\/press-releases\/syria-armed-group-carries-out-summary-killing-security-forces-idlib-2012-11 <br \/>\nAs  stated by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights spokesperson, Rupert Colville  on 2 November 2012. For more information, see: GENEVA \/ SYRIA &ndash; SUMMARY  EXECUTIONS,  http:\/\/www.unmultimedia.org\/tv\/unifeed\/2012\/11\/geneva-syria-summary-executions\/ <br \/>\nYara al-Saleh and Abdullah Tubara were freed by the Syrian army following  clashes between the FSA group that had abducted them and the Syrian army.  Hussam Imad remained in the custody of the FSA group following the clash, but  escaped the following day by reportedly leaping from a window. Hatem Abu Yehyeh  is reported to have been killed on the first day of captivity, although  accounts of how he was killed vary and his body has not been returned or found. <br \/>\nAlawite Muslims are generally regarded as an off-shoot of Shi&rsquo;a Islam. Alawite  and Shi&rsquo;a Muslims together are believed to constitute around 13 per cent of  Syria&rsquo;s population. The name Alawite stems from the community&rsquo;s veneration of  Ali Bin Abi Taleb, the fourth caliph after the death of the Prophet Mohammad  who is considered to be the first Imam in Shi&rsquo;a Islam. <br \/>\nSee  for example the report of the UN independent international Commission of  Inquiry, 5 February 2013, Index: A\/HRC\/22\/59,  http:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/Documents\/HRBodies\/HRCouncil\/CoISyria\/A.HRC.22.59_en.pdf <br \/>\nFor  example, acclaimed author Samar Yazbek is an Alawite Muslim who supported the  opposition in the early days of the unrest of 2011 and who was arrested five  times by the Syrian authorities before she left the country. Mounzir Makhous,  the envoy of the Syrian opposition to France is an Alawite Muslim. <br \/>\nThe  al-Baraa&rsquo; Brigade accused the Iranian nationals of belonging to the Iranian  Revolutionary Guard Corps and of being in the country to provide military  support to the Syrian government. The Iranian government insisted that the men  &#8211; some of whom they said were retired Revolutionary Guards officials &#8211; were pilgrims  who were travelling to the Sayyida Zainab shrine in the suburbs of Damascus. <br \/>\nAmnesty International was unable to confirm whether that number of prisoners  and detainees were indeed released, but is aware of the release of four women  as part of the exchange. See Syria: Further information: Syrian &quot;Peace  Brides&quot; released from detention, 11 January 2013, Index: MDE 24\/003\/2013,  http:\/\/www.amnesty.org\/en\/library\/info\/MDE24\/003\/2013\/en <br \/>\nThese included recognition of the FSA by the Lebanese government, for Hassan  Nasrallah, head of the Lebanese organization Hizbullah, to apologise for his  support of the Syrian president Bashar al-Assad and for the Syrian government  to release some 500 prisoners. Most recently, on 1 March 2013, the group issued  a statement demanding the release of women detainees held by the Syrian  government in return for the release of the Lebanese hostages. <br \/>\nThe  UN independent international Commission of Inquiry found in it report published  on 5 February 2013 that &ldquo;[t]here were comparatively more reports of killings by  anti-Government armed groups during the period under review [15 July 2012 to 15  January 2013]. Most accounts emanated from Damascus and Aleppo governorates.  Several of those interviewed also spoke about killings in Dara&rsquo;a, Homs and Dayr  az Zawr&rdquo;. (paragraph 61).   HYPERLINK  &quot;http:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/Documents\/HRBodies\/HRCouncil\/CoISyria\/A.HRC.22.59_en.pdf&quot;  http:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/Documents\/HRBodies\/HRCouncil\/CoISyria\/A.HRC.22.59_en.pdf <br \/>\nThe  International Committee of the Red Cross announced in July 2012 that the  internal armed conflict previously confined to Homs, Hama and Idlib had spread  to other areas of the country. <br \/>\nInterview conducted by Amnesty International in Lebanon on 1 December 2012. <br \/>\nIts  full name is Jabhat al-Nusra li Ahl al-Sham min Mujahidi al-Sham fi Sahat  al-Jihad which officially announced its formation in late January 2012. It is  not affiliated to the FSA. <br \/>\nJabhat al-Nusra statement can be seen on   HYPERLINK &quot;http:\/\/archive.org\/details\/jbht-n9rh-13-19&quot; http:\/\/archive.org\/details\/jbht-n9rh-13-19; last seen by Amnesty  International on 13 March 2013. <br \/>\nAs  issued in a statement by Jabhat al-Nusra on 15 October 2012:  HYPERLINK  &quot;http:\/\/archive.org\/stream\/JN.123\/JN_press121#page\/n0\/mode\/1up&quot; http:\/\/archive.org\/stream\/JN.123\/JN_press121#page\/n0\/mode\/1up; last seen by Amnesty  International on 13 March 2013. <br \/>\nSuch as in statements issued by Jabhat al-Nusra in February, including 15  February 2013. http:\/\/www.hamafree.com\/index.php?name=news&amp;op=view&amp;id=4147 <br \/>\nThe  UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic  stated in its 5 February 2013 report (paragraph 63) &ldquo;[as] the State law  enforcement and justice system have disintegrated in certain areas of the  country, anti-Government armed groups have turned to traditional social  structures, often based around religious institutions, to fill the vacuum.  According to descriptions received, these mechanisms do not meet international  judicial standards as defined under international humanitarian law. Passing  sentences or executing without due process is a war crime.&rdquo; <br \/>\nPhone interview conducted by Amnesty International on 11 March 2013. <br \/>\nPhone interview conducted by Amnesty International on 1 March 2013. <br \/>\nVideo published on YouTube on 9 December 2012; last seen by Amnesty  International on 10 March 2013:  http:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=dE7luGRe9Ag&amp;feature=youtu.be&amp;bpctr=1362921340 <br \/>\nInterview conducted by Amnesty International in Lebanon on 3 January 2013. <br \/>\nThe  FSA brigades relocated to the Homs neighbourhoods of Jobar and al-Sultaniyeh,  close to a major checkpoint in Homs called Kfar &lsquo;Aya, following their loss of  the Homs district of Baba Amr to the Syrian army in early March 2012. <br \/>\nInterview conducted by Amnesty International in Lebanon on 30 November 2012. <br \/>\nLast seen by Amnesty International on 12 March 2013:  http:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=g-cdUyWjOlU <br \/>\nInterviews conducted by Amnesty International in person in Lebanon and by phone  on 3 January, 28 February, 2 March and 3 March 2013. <br \/>\nPhone interview conducted by Amnesty International on 10 March 2013. <br \/>\nPhone interview conducted by Amnesty International on 28 February 2013. <br \/>\nPhone interview conducted by Amnesty International on 2 March 2013. <br \/>\nFootage seen by Amnesty International on 3 March 2013. <br \/>\nPhone interview conducted by Amnesty International on 2 March 2013. <br \/>\nInterview conducted by Amnesty International in Lebanon on 26 December 2012. <br \/>\nJabhat al-Nusra&rsquo;s statement on his killing.   HYPERLINK &quot;http:\/\/www.as-ansar.com\/vb\/showthread.php?t=67569&quot; http:\/\/www.as-ansar.com\/vb\/showthread.php?t=67569; last seen by Amnesty  International on 13 March 2013. <br \/>\nHYPERLINK  &quot;https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/HomsumAlhnaien\/posts\/427894347272723&quot; https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/HomsumAlhnaien\/posts\/427894347272723 <br \/>\nYara al-Saleh reiterated this to Amnesty International. <br \/>\nSee  Amnesty International, Syria: Attack on TV station condemned as UN report finds  violence worsening, 27 June 2012,  http:\/\/www.amnesty.org\/en\/news\/syria-attack-tv-station-condemned-un-report-finds-violence-worsening-2012-06-27 <br \/>\nMembers of these communities are commonly perceived by opposition forces to be  supportive of the government and\/or of President Bashar al-Assad, in Homs  although Amnesty International is aware that not all members of these  communities hold such views. <br \/>\nAn  example of the rising tensions in Homs is demonstrated by an attack on a Shi&rsquo;a  Muslim family in al-Bayada neighbourhood of Homs during the funeral of an  opposition fighter, Khaled al-Dandal al-&lsquo;Afnan. He had been killed on 11 July  2011 in the Khaldiyeh neighbourhood of Homs. Angry mourners near his home in  al-Bayada attacked a nearby house belonging to a Shi&rsquo;a Muslim family while around  14 women and children were in the house. The family hid in one of the rooms and  relatives jumped onto the roof and broke a window to allow them to escape  through their neighbour&rsquo;s home. The family left al-Bayada the same day,  according to a relative. One man who was a relative of this family told Amnesty  International that his family and a few other Shi&rsquo;a Muslim families also left  al-Bayada after this attack. <br \/>\nPhone interview conducted by Amnesty International on 3 March 2013. <br \/>\nPhone interview conducted by Amnesty International on 1 March 2013. <br \/>\nPhone interview conducted by Amnesty International on 2 March 2013. <br \/>\nReport of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian  Arab Republic submitted at the Human Rights Council on its twenty-second  session on 5 February 2013. <br \/>\nGrave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I and most  other serious violations of international humanitarian law are war crimes.  Definitions of some of these crimes are included in the Rome Statute of the  International Criminal Court (Rome Statute). <br \/>\nRome Statute to the ICC, Article 8(2)(c)(i). <br \/>\nArticle 86 (2) of Protocol I, states: &ldquo;The fact that a breach of the  Conventions or of this Protocol was committed by a subordinate does not absolve  his superiors from penal or disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if  they knew, or had information which should have enabled them to conclude in the  circumstances at the time, that he was committing or was going to commit such a  breach and if they did not take all feasible measures within their power to  prevent or repress the breach.&rdquo;\n<\/p>\n<p>\n&nbsp;\n<\/p>\n<p>\nSource URL: <a href=\"https:\/\/www.amnesty.org\/en\/library\/asset\/MDE24\/008\/2013\/en\/21461c90-3702-4892-aa3c-4974bba54689\/mde240082013en.html\">https:\/\/www.amnesty.org\/en\/library\/asset\/MDE24\/008\/2013\/en\/21461c90-3702-4892-aa3c-4974bba54689\/mde240082013en.html<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>\n14 March 2013  &#8211; &#8220;My daughter  shouted to me, &lsquo;mum, come quick and see dad.&rsquo; He was on TV&hellip; as he was shown  being killed, I pushed my daughter away to block her from seeing&hellip; but she did  see.&#8221;<\/p>\n<p>\nWidow of Colonel Fou&rsquo;ad Abd al-Rahman, as identified by his  family, whose beheading with Colonel Izz al-Din Badr was aired on television  and the Internet.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1161","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/dchrs.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1161","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/dchrs.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/dchrs.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dchrs.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dchrs.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=1161"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/dchrs.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1161\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/dchrs.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=1161"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dchrs.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=1161"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dchrs.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=1161"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}